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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Article offers an analytical description of the legal framework of the Indonesian biofuel energy policy: 
commercialization of Jatropha. Its purpose is to explain why the legal framework failed.  Methodology used to 
collect data is library research, including shifting through related legal documents. Additional information was 
collected through interviews with key informants. The purpose is to be able to place the relevant legal 
framework within a broader economic-political context. The main findings were that government intervention in 
the economic sector (commercialization of Jatropha), were made more in the spirit of poverty eradication 
programs and lessening government financial burden in providing cheap fossil fuel.  Cautious approach based 
on economic calculations and other considerations (Jatropha not being sufficiently tested and developed as 
biofuel crop) as advised by researchers (2006) working under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture were 
simply ignored. 
 
Keywords: commercialization, Jatropha curcas, legal framework, economic regulation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The development of Jatropha as alternative energy to fossil fuel was initiated, emerged and 
latter on fizzles in Indonesia during the 2004-2006. Article attempts to offer an analytical description 
of the relevant rules and regulation, influencing the Indonesian bio-fuel energy policy, especially those 
that relates to the commercial utilization of Jatropha. In addition, the initiative to utilize the jarak shrub 
and develop it into a big commercialized scale (estate crop), must be placed within legal and policy 
framework of the energy sector. 
 
There is the possibility that the answer to why the Jatropha idea emerged and fizzles are to be 
found not in analyzing the existing legal framework. It is not a purely legal issue at all. A better 
answer should be sought at the political plane. That it was simply a matter of no sufficient political 
will from the government to push things through, an unwillingness reflected into the non-issuance of 
technical guidance or directives required by bureaucrats at the lowest level to realize and implement 
central government plans (Vel & Makambombu, 2010). It is also possible that the answer is more 
leaning towards economic calculation than law or politics, i.e. the lack of interest shown by private 
companies (domestic/foreign investors) in utilizing economic opportunities created by the national 
policy on biofuel (Slette & Wiyono, 2011). It might be that the main obstacle is found from and within 
the fossil fuel management and utilization policy. Evidently every approach contains some truth, but 
could not by itself expose the complete story. Nonetheless, all partial explanation conveys similar 
problem: how government policies as translated into law and other government action influence 
economic decisions (Birkland, 2010). To expose how the Indonesian biofuel policy influenced the 
emergence of the Jatropha commercialization initiative and how it fizzles, a different approach should 
be used. 
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This study, for reasons explained below, will focus on what economic regulations inform and 
influence the behavior of entrepreneurs (farmers, entrepreneurs, investors). How did those economic 
regulations create opportunities or on the contrary hamper the development of the industry. There are a 
number of reasons underlying this particular choice. The success or the failure of developing palm oil 
or Jatropha estate and industry as well as Jatropha is related to the working of quite a number of legal 
rules/regulations issued by different government levels and actors. These comprises of laws regulating 
the establishment of economic enterprises (Company Law, Foreign/Domestic Investment Law), its 
operation and management (land acquisitions, permits and recommendations to be acquired, contract 
law), and all other legal issues related to it, such as labor law, the environmental management law, 
industry law, etc. Undoubtedly, it will be very difficult to provide a comprehensive view of the legal 
framework. What would be possible as had been conducted by other researchers is to choose and 
discuss one sector only (for example on those that pertain to the land acquisition or only referring to 
the permit system in place).  However, the hard fact that there is no established specialized field of law 
focusing only on bio-fuel energy or the commercialization of Jatropha as a source of bio-fuel has to be 
accepted. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Other articles discuss the legal framework of bio-fuel policy conducted for Indonesia or other 
countries tended to use a bird’s eye perspective focusing on the energy and/or agricultural policy. A 
top-bottom and wide-angle approach, in illustration, can be found elaborating on laws (acts) developed 
in the energy and agricultural sector which either directly or indirectly pertains to the commercial 
utilization of jathropha as alternative energy (Soetoprawiro, 2013). In comparison, other authors 
discussing similar legal frameworks in China (Wang, 2011) or Mozambique (Schut et. al, 2010) opted 
for a more brief analysis. One critique of the above approach is that if fails to provide a satisfactory 
answer (from a legal viewpoint) about how the law (legal rules and regulations) relates to policy 
forming and implementation. How did the energy policy affect law making and to what extent did 
existing rules and regulation influence the commercialization of the Jatropha shrub (as biofuel source) 
(Colbran, 2011; Henning, 2004). What is implied by those legalistic approaches is that certain 
government policies (the commercialization of Jatropha shrub as a source of industrial bio-fuel and 
linked to that certain targets to be achieved within a certain time-line) if to be successfully 
implemented must be performed under the prevailing laws. It assumes the automatic and positive 
influence of the existing legal framework for policy making and implementation. Two other issues are 
neglected, i. e. which government agency is responsible and authorized to issue policy and bear the 
responsibility to implement and how non-governmental actors (the business community, individual 
entrepreneurs or others stakeholders) reacted to and influenced law and policy making. 
 
Rather than using a wide approach the traditional legal science methodology, the use of the 
theory of economic regulation is suggested. The exposition of the relevant legal framework cannot by 
itself explain the emergence and the eclipse of the commercialization of Jatropha (Jarak). Using this 
approach, we can identify clusters of legal rules and regulations (soft as well as hard laws) which 
inform actors and influence economic decisions making. One important characteristic of such a cluster 
is that it is dynamic: which regulations are most relevant and provide new opportunities or in contrast 
discourages certain economic behavior changes all the time. With this it is also to avoid giving the 
impression, a trap easily entered when discussing legal frameworks of a certain policy, to present a 
comprehensive (covering 100%) overview. Instead with this perspective, it becomes clear how 
government policy works out through law in practice and how entrepreneurs (and government 
institutions/officials) made their decisions. 
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Stigler defines economic regulation as intervention (by the state or government) designed to 
affect market decisions made by firms and individuals (…) it’s central task  is to explain who will 
receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what form regulation will take, and the effects of 
regulation upon the allocation of resources (Stigler, 1971). In comparison, Posner (1974) argued that 
economic regulation properly defined refers to taxes and subsidies of all sorts as well as to explicit 
legislative and administrative control over rates, entry and other facets of economic activity. 
Consequently, economic regulation can be found in law in its widest sense specifically those that 
affect the working of the market. In this sense, economic regulation is equated with government. 
Government regulation or public regulation refers to the implementation of rules by government 
agencies that are backed up by law. He goes even further by arguing that regulation means 
employment of legal instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives (Aktan, 
2011; OECD, 2008). This economic regulation approach corresponds with McAuslan advice on how 
to conduct research on the legal aspects and implementation of spatial or land use planning. He 
suggested to ask the what, why, who at what level questions; specifically to look for what 
rules/regulations (issued by which government level and which government actor) which really 
informs and influence patterns of actual or potential land use (McAuslan, 1981). 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
There is a general consensus that the search for alternative energy source, including the search 
for developing biofuel including commercialization of Jathropa Curcas is based on the widely felt 
apprehension that natural oil and gas reserve of Indonesia would be depleted soon and the need to seek 
solution to Indonesia’s economy high dependency to cheap supply of fossil fuel (Slette & Wijono, 
2011). Anxiety about the sustainability of energy supply or energy security might be the one of the 
primary and official reason behind the issuance of the Presidential Regulation (PR) 5/2006 on the 
national energy policy. In PR 5/2006, the government stipulated that by 2025, biofuel use should reach 
5% of the total national energy consumption and that this goal (Art. 3) must be achieved by 
developing primary and secondary/supporting policies, i.e. pursuing energy diversification programs 
and the determination of affordable price of energy taking into account economic feasibility while also 
considering the granting of subsidies to poor households (direct cash). PR 5/2006 also includes the 
instruction to formulate action plan: the national energy management blueprint 2005-2025). Jatropha 
as well as palm oil was not yet mentioned as a separate and important alternate energy source. To 
follow up, the President issued Presidential Instruction 1/2006 (supply and utilization of biofuel) and 
was addressed as well as contain a detailed distribution of authorities to 13 government 
agencies/ministries. 
 
It is daunting to imagine how the president must muster and exerts his political clout to force 
those different ministries, coordinating and state ministries (without portfolios) as well as diverse 
ministries, all with their sectoral/specialized agendas, more often than not collaborating with members 
of opposing political parties rather than with the president’s political party, to conjure up a cohesive 
and viable plan to coordinate their development plans and agenda to meet the stated goals in the 
Presidential regulation (2005) as well the instruction (2006). Adding to the complexity of coordination 
is that each ministry produces its policies backed up by a vast bundle of dynamic legal rules and 
regulations. 
 
One important issue in this respect is how to guarantee good coordination, integration, 
synchronization (and added to its simplification) (Bedner & Niessen, 2003). Which government 
institution and at which level is responsible for what? Is the Bappenas (National Development 
Planning Board) or a special body/board established specifically for that task (the Dewan Energy 
Nasional (National Energy Board) established by virtue of Law 30/2007, or the ad hoc National Team 
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for Renewable Energy (TimNas BBN) which specific task is to develop a roadmap for biofuel 
development in the context of alleviating Poverty and Unemployment. (no name, 2007). One huge 
problem here is to find which government institution (or related private actor) is supposed to be 
responsible to influence how the biofuel policy is implemented into concrete actions. From a legal 
viewpoint, the question then will be put forward which legal rule will be directly relevant and in 
reality guide actor's behavior. It is all too clear that the development of biofuel industry (including the 
establishment of Jatropha estates as well as other crops), for its implementation, necessitates the 
delegation of certain tasks such as implementing campaigning and facilitating land allotment to the 
provincial and district government (Vel, 2012). To what extent does such distribution of power 
scheme induce the provincial and districts to do their best in realizing a top-down central government 
policy is a different question altogether. 
 
Synchronization of all existing plans is a must. Ideally, a cohesive government plan should 
convey a clear message to would-be investors which business initiatives is or will be prioritized where 
and when. This is illustrated by both the Central Kalimantan Provincial government master estate crop 
development planning (Rencana Induk Pengembangan Perkebunan/RIPP) and Spatial Plan 
(Provincial Regulation 3/1993) which make possible the expansion of palm oil crop estates. In 2009, 
the government issued 302 permits for the palm oil industry, covering land amounting to 4,011,032. 
364 hectares to be divided into those that are already operational (144 units; 1,687,969.104 hectares) 
and those that are not yet operational (158 units; 2,323,063.446 hectares) (Sulaeman, 2009; Badan 
Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pertanian, 2012). This may be contrasted with findings from the fields 
as related to Jatropha. 
 
As indicated by Vel (2012), the Service for Industry and Trade neglected its duties to 
campaign and market Jatropa as that Service had been more interested in eco-tourism development 
than agricultural commodity trade. Most likely the Service for Industry and Trade of West Sumba had 
different development goals in mind. As it is, contradictory master-plans (general-sectoral 
development planning, spatial planning land use planning) made by different government services (at 
different levels) was and is up to present not uncommon and this creates competition in the allotment 
of land. Ideally speaking, investors should be relying on existing spatial plans to see how many lands 
has been allotted to support what kind of business and where to acquire land. 
 
Clarity and certainty of land allotment in the spatial plan, again ideally speaking, should 
determine whether or not investors may apply for permit-in-principle or site permit (Moeliono, 2011), 
both necessary to start acquiring the land for the planned business investment and which will also 
determine whether or not the investors will be eligible to apply for and obtain the estate crop permit 
(izin usaha perkebunan) (Roijen, 2012). At the same time, the same plan (or even rumors of certain 
land use plan) in practice more often than not result in mass land grabbing by actors (land speculators) 
who acquires “inside information”. This great part contributes to the occurrence of land conflicts and 
disputes throughout Indonesia (Fairhead et al., 2012). 
 
Important for the creation of a vibrant biofuel market is the policy related to the permit (+ 
recommendation) system. Through the licensing/permit system, government agencies ought to be able 
to control access by regulating who may enter a particular business sector (biodiesel and/or Jatropha 
estate crop and processing). It might be that the licensing system is put in place but serves different 
goals aside from directing and controlling business actors' behavior. Both the business people and 
government agencies may disregard the system altogether or, more often than not, businesses people 
develop avoidance tactics by using other strategies, such as establishing or utilizing informal social 
networks to get things done and avoid red tape bureaucracy created by the vast and complex permit 
system. 
 
In any case, referring to the Presidential Instruction, it is the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
who hold the authority in controlling access to the Jatropha estate crop business. The Ministerial 
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Regulation of Energy and Mineral 51/2006 provides the conditions for and guidance (in obtaining) 
permit to trade biofuel (persyaratan dan Pedoman Izin Usaha Niaga Bahan Bakar Nabati sebagai 
bahan bakar lain). Pursuant to this special procedure (deviating from the general procedure for 
engaging in other crop estates outside biofuel crops) all enterprise entering the Jatropha estate crop 
sector, including the supply of, processing and trade of biofuel products must obtain a special permit 
that is biofuel business permit issued by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral. This authority might be 
delegated to the governor in case of enterprises with production capacity amounting to 
10.000/annually or to the District heads in case of enterprises with production capacity less than 
5000/annually. This ministerial regulation is followed by ministerial regulation 32/2008 on the supply 
utilization and marketing of biofuel (penyediaan dan pemanfaatan dan tataniaga bahan bakar nabati 
sebagai bahan bakar lain). This 2008 regulation stated that priority in granting permit should be given 
to cooperation, small scale enterprises and national companies (domestic investment) (Art. 21). In this 
regulation, it is found that a reflection of the TimNas triple strategy is pro-growth, pro job, and pro-
poor. This might also explain why cooperation (or other small scale business enterprises), estimated to 
be millions are targeted to enter into this particular business. Nonetheless, foreign investors are also 
allowed to submit business permit applications (Roijen, 2012). 
 
The official policy for developing or supporting bio-industry is thus that the primary economic 
actors i.e. Jatropha estate crops will be cooperatives (small and medium scale economic enterprises) 
under the auspices and with the financial support of the Ministry of Cooperation. Placed outside 
consideration is the issue whether existing small/medium scale groups of farmers (cooperatives) would 
possess the capital and necessary skill/techniques and are ready to enter the market which at that time 
(2006-2007) does not even exist or was at a preliminary (infant) stage. To what extent and for how 
long can they sustain economic loss due to market failures? It might be that linked to such calculations 
are policies to establish partnership and nucleus estates as found in the Ministry of Agriculture’s road 
map of 2007 mentioned earlier. Findings from field studies conducted by Jarak researcher (Wijaya, 
2012; Gunawan, 2012) revealed that farmers or other entrepreneurs who earlier decided to plant 
Jatropha were frustrated because no one seems to buy harvested Jatropha (Dewin, 2012). 
 
The reason for the low market response may be influenced by a different factor. As illustrated 
by the case of Pura Group, which was in 2006 started a pilot project manufacturing Jatropha oil 
processing machines and adaptor kits to be attached to power generators using diesel fuel. They did 
more in the spirit of supporting energy self-sufficient villages a state-sponsored program rather than 
commercial considerations (Sujianto, 2006). This particular governmental goal stands out, i.e. the 
energy self-sufficient villages, which does not relate at all to the deliberate attempt to create supply 
and demand of Jatropha or other biofuels. In 2007, Purnomo Yusgiantoro, (then) Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral, introduced the Energy Self-Sufficient Village (Desa Mandiri Energi/DME) program. 
Villages are expected to produce and meet their own energy demands (…) and that will create new 
jobs, eradicate poverty and engender other positive activities (Purnamasari, 2012). There will be two 
types of DME: the first one which utilizes renewable energy such as micro hydro electrical power 
plants, solar energy or biogas, and the second one is DME that relies on biofuel. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The discussion reveals how the government initiated various schemes (government 
intervention through the biofuel policy as worked into rules and regulations) to create a sustainable 
biofuel market from Jatropha crop. To do that, the central government (the President) attempted to 
overcome bureaucratic hurdles and circumvent red tape by appointing the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral as the main coordinator with the power to supervise how other ministries and government 
agencies implement the presidential instruction. At the same time, however, this initiative, rather than 
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reducing coordination-synchronization (governance) issues, resulted in more complex web of 
overlapping authorities. Simultaneously it stimulates over-dependence on the central government 
outreach and budgeting. It might be that it this dependency obstruct the establishment of a sustainable 
Jatropha biofuel market. 
 
Another issue was that economic opportunities created through legal incentives (government 
intervention in the economic sector) particularly related to Jatropha were made more in the spirit of 
poverty eradication programs (pro-growth, pro-job and pro-poor) and lessening government financial 
burden in providing cheap fossil fuel (the DME program). Budget considerations apparently dominate. 
Not surprisingly cautious approach based on economic calculations and other considerations (Jatropha 
not being sufficiently tested and developed as biofuel crop) were simply ignored. Another issue is the 
ever present possibility of capture by nonstate actors or even by low-level bureaucrats who may create 
informal markets (in project or business proposals) or illicit trade in land (land grabbing) (De Soto, 
2000). On a more abstract level, it is not so much the existing legal framework which is important in 
stimulating new emerging sectors or the establishment of the conducive investment climate, but what 
government initiatives were there and how it was translated into policies, rules, and regulations in the 
form of hard law or soft law. It is this approach of economic regulation which is believed may be more 
useful in analyzing governance of new or even more established economic sectors. 
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